Towards a Multi-level Exploration of Human and Computational Re-representation in Unified Cognitive Frameworks by Olteţeanu, Ana-Maria et al.
ORIGINAL RESEARCH
published: 30 April 2019
doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2019.00940






Medical School Berlin, Germany
Varun Dutt,






This article was submitted to
Cognition,
a section of the journal
Frontiers in Psychology
Received: 12 December 2018
Accepted: 08 April 2019
Published: 30 April 2019
Citation:
Oltet¸eanu A-M, Schöttner M and
Bahety A (2019) Towards a Multi-level









Ana-Maria Oltet¸eanu*, Mikkel Schöttner and Arpit Bahety
Creative Cognitive Systems, Human-Centered Computing, Institute of Computer Science, Freie Universität Berlin, Berlin,
Germany
Re-representation is a critical ability to (i) understanding human creative problem solving,
and (ii) modeling computational cognitive systems able to support or perform creative
problem solving tasks on their own. This paper proposes a unified multi-level cognitive
approach to investigating re-representation: the study of sensory-based, concept-based
and problem template based possible forms of re-representations in an integrated
manner. Descriptions and explanations of each level prepare the ground for further
computational modeling. A study is deployed in order to explore the relationship
between the various tasks proposed to reflect re-representation. A significant correlation
between the investigated tasks is discovered. Two previous studies from the literature
are replicated. A new strong and significant relationship between the Pattern Meanings
Test and the Alternative Uses Test is observed.
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1. INTRODUCTION
Imagine that you are given a problem, and try to solve it in vain for half an hour. After a while, you
take a break from it and focus on something else. In the middle of this other activity, an altogether
different way of seeing your previous problem pops into your mind. It feels like the elements of
the problem have shifted, have reorganized in the mean time; that now you understand what is
truly important, and how you should have tackled the problem in the first place. You experience
a moment of clarity and promise: this new way of seeing the problem may allow you to find the
solution, or at least to make further progress. It is quite possible you have, in the case above,
experienced a case of re-representation.
Re-representation is a human cognitive ability encountered in processes of creativity and
creative problem-solving. From a computational perspective, the better understanding and
modeling of re-representation will enable us not only to study a cognitive skill to a deeper level,
but also to implement the next generation of knowledge discovery and creative problem solving
systems of cognitive inspiration. A computational system endowed with re-representation would
have the same ability to view problems and datasets in different ways, generating new creative and
insightful solution paths and discovering new knowledge. With re-representation being a cognitive
process likely to become the next challenge in knowledge based systems, the main research
questions addressed here are: (i) how can we better understand, characterize and empirically study
re-representational abilities of the human mind, (ii) how can we begin to conceptualize and model
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them via computational modeling techniques? and (iii) is there
promise that existing tasks from the empirical literature can be
used to study re-representation in a cohesive manner?
Various cognitive abilities related to creativity have been
studied in the literature, with computational systems capable of
similar feats sometimes being implemented. Example of such
abilities are: remote association (Mednick and Mednick, 1971;
Oltet¸eanu and Falomir, 2015; Oltet¸eanu et al., 2017, 2018),
analogy (Gentner, 1983; Falkenhainer et al., 1989; Holyoak and
Thagard, 1996), metaphor (Lakoff and Johnson, 1980, 1999;
Veale andHao, 2008), concept blending (Fauconnier and Turner,
1998; Eppe et al., 2015), etc. Being part of the creativity
cognitive skills family, an ability for re-representation might
(i) be related or similar to some creativity skills (e.g., analogy
and metaphor), or (ii) use other skills on which the creative
process relies on (e.g., association). However, before making
any claims regarding relationships to other creativity cognitive
skills or processes, a stronger systematic approach to generally
understanding, characterizing and studying re-representation
is necessary.
Various cognitive architectures with different types of
theoretical and representational commitments exist, being used
for the modeling of various sets of tasks and processes: ACT-R
(Lovett, 1998), SOAR (Laird et al., 1987), CLARION (Sun, 2007),
EPIC (Kieras and Meyer, 1997), Leabra (O’Reilly, 1996), SAL
(Jilk et al., 2008), etc. However, no such architecture deals with
creative processes in a unified manner. Unified approaches to
some processes have been proposed (Oltet¸eanu, 2014; Oltet¸eanu,
2016), but they do not yet involve re-representation.
To start an unification in this direction, re-representation
as a process needs to be studied in a variety of different
settings, so that the cognitive framework accommodating
one facet of the process can also deal with its other
manifestations. In the unified spirit of cognitive architectures
put forward by Newell (1994), this paper proposes that
cognitive frameworks aimed at studying and implementing re-
representation would need to systematically do so at different
levels of cognitive skill. This would require defining different
levels which have chances to be unified by the same process,
and doing so in terms which make the process amenable to
computational implementation. Here, an approach in which
multiple possible levels of re-representation are explored is
proposed, and these levels are discussed in computational
modeling terms. The main aim is to set a foundation
toward the combined empirical and computationally sound
study of re-representation in cognitive architectures. These
levels are related to specific existing creativity tasks, to offer
a good shot at empirical falsification of this unified re-
representation study hypothesis, and a sturdy benchmark to
compare future computational models against. An exploratory
study is deployed to confirm or refute initial relationships
between these tasks.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: the three levels of
re-representation are first described in section 2. The first level—
of feature to object re-representation—is explored in possible
computational and modeling terms in section 3. The second
level—of object and properties re-representation—is described in
FIGURE 1 | The duck rabbit illusion.
section 4. The third level—of objects and problem template re-
representations—is explored in section 5. The study deployed
to explore the relationship between these tasks is reported in
section 6. An overview of the possible similarities, differences
and interplay between the various levels is discussed in section
8, together with the study results.
2. THREE LEVELS OF
RE-REPRESENTATION DESCRIBED
THROUGH VARIOUS CREATIVITY TASKS
In the following, four different creative problem solving tasks will
be briefly described, together with their possible relations to the
ability for re-representation. The tasks are:
1) the ambiguous figures task;
2) the pattern and line meanings tests (Wallach and Kogan,
1965);
3) the Alternative Uses Test (Guilford et al., 1978) and
4) insight problems (Maier, 1931; Duncker, 1945;
Dow and Mayer, 2004).
Based on these four tasks, three potential levels of re-
representation will be discussed.
Imagine you are looking at an ambiguous figure, like the
one shown in Figure 1, and can only initially see a rabbit. You
might be told that a different image (a duck) can also be seen,
and voluntarily attempt to see it, or you might experience a
spontaneous surprising moment in which the second image
“pops up” all of a sudden. Now you can most likely switch
between seeing these different images at will. In fact, participants
presented with this task might be asked to press a button every
time they are able to switch their representation of the stimulus
(Doherty andMair, 2012)—this evaluative measurement is called
frequency of reversal. How are ambiguous figures related to re-
representation? Our approach proposes that ambiguous images
can stand in for a level of the ability which involves level of an
ability for re-representing visual features in images as different
possible objects or entities.
The pattern meanings test by Wallach and Kogan (1965)
gives participants abstract pattern stimuli like the one shown in
Figure 2A. The task of the participants is to describe, verbally or
in writing, all the things that they think these patterns could be,
or all of the things that these patterns remind them of (note the
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FIGURE 2 | Creativity tests by Wallach and Kogan (1965). (A) pattern
meanings test. (B) Line meanings test.
reference to memory, which we will pick up again in section 3.2).
For example, the pattern in Figure 2A can be seen as a collection
of barstools in front of a table, people waiting in line next to a
building, flower heads coming from a rectangular flower pot, a
Newton’s cradle toy etc.
A similar task is presented by the line meanings test (Wallach
and Kogan, 1965), in which a line like the one in Figure 2B is
presented and the participants have to come up with things the
line could be—for example the contour of a mountain chain, an
uneven saw, a comb with broken teeth, etc1.
The pattern meaning and line meaning tests have in common
the following: during both tasks, an abstract stimulus (or set of
features) is repeatedly re-represented by the participants through
various known representations.
The number of alternate interpretations that participants
come up with is part of the evaluation of results in pattern
and line meaning tests. This type of interpretation and re-
representation can still be positioned at the level of interpreting
features as objects. Unlike in the ambiguous figures task, the
objects through which the re-representation is made are not
restricted to two, nor present in the figure; they rely on
the knowledge of the solver. Because of this, more than two
interpretations are also possible (ambiguous figures can generally
be represented in two, or a maximum of three ways).
The Alternative Uses test by Guilford et al. (1978) gives
participants an object, and asks them to come up with as many
uses as they can for it. For example, the object “brick” is given,
and participants can come up with uses like the following: a brick
can be used as a paperweight, a weapon, a doorstop, around the
fire, to write on the pavement with, etc.
In order to connect this task to re-representation, the process
of coming up with different possible uses needs to be considered.
A proposal for how this type of creative inference (coming up
with alternative uses for objects) can be done is the following:
after the object has been given (e.g., dental floss), its properties
(shape, weight, material, size) and their combinations are re-
represented as other possible objects (the shape and material
of dental floss make this object easy to re-represent as a long
piece of string, for example). Then, the affordances of the objects
they were re-represented into can be applied back to the initial
objects (for example, dental floss can be used for sewing). This
very inference is actually part of the set of creative inferences
1The difference between the line meanings test and the pattern meanings test is
that the line is a continuous stimulus, and some set-ups assume it should not be
broken into pieces by the participants when they are providing the interpretation.
FIGURE 3 | The weight problem.
made by a system computationally implementing this process
(Oltet¸eanu and Falomir, 2016).
This is thus a case for re-representation if the properties
or features of an object are interpreted as properties and
features of another object, in order to come up with the
new affordance. Therefore, the Alternative Uses test might
involve the level of an ability to re-represent objects and
their properties as different objects in a household domain
environment, in order to be able to come up with creative uses
for said objects. This level of re-representation, together with
the process by which OROC (Oltet¸eanu and Falomir, 2016), a
prototype computational system capable of performing this task,
produces answers, will be discussed in more computational detail
in Section 4.
Insight problems represent more complex tasks, in which a
set of objects (daily objects, abstract objects or sometimes just
patterns) in various relationships are presented to the solver.
For example, the weight problem (Duncker, 1945), which we
illustrated by Figure 3, is stated as follows: You are to help the
observer set up the room for an experiment. You need to attach the
pendulum to the ceiling. What do you do?
The participants start thinking of various action plans
(involving sets of actions, combination of objects and object
affordances) that can help them solve the problem. After a while,
it becomes clear that one of the core issues of solving the problem
is the ability to attach one of the nails on the table to the ceiling,
in order to fix the string on the ceiling and attach the pendulum
to it. Various ways of achieving this are attempted. A productive
path is the endeavor to create a hammer out of existing objects—
attempts to realize this involve human solvers proposing to use
the top of the staircase as a hammer, wrapping the spool of
string or folded plastic glasses in a sock in order to make them
“harder,” or, Duncker’s correct solution, using the pendulum itself
to hammer in the nail before attaching it to a piece of string.
This shows re-representation at work in insight problems—re-
representing some objects (the pendulum) as another needed
object (the hammer)—in a flavor which is similar to OROC’s
processes when solving the AUT. However, multiple objects and
sets of actions might also be represented in multiple ways, using
already known ways of solving problems (what we call problem
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FIGURE 4 | Overview of the proposed levels of re-representation.
templates) and their subsets. A deeper examination and example
of this level are shown in section 5.
In summary, the three levels at which re-representation can be
explored proposed here are:
1. the ability to re-represent features as different sets of objects
or images in the case of ambiguous figures;
2. the ability to re-represent objects and their properties as
different objects; we will generally discuss this in a household
domain environment, focusing on the ability to use objects
creatively when traditional objects that would be used are
missing2 and
3. the ability to re-represent objects and scenes under different
problem templates, as to be able to computationally tackle the
solving of human insight problems in the future.
An overview of the various levels of re-representation and
empirical tasks with which re-representation could be studied at
that level is presented in Figure 4. This is of course meant as the
initial sketch, not an exhaustive list.
Some preliminary evidence points in the direction of the
validity of such an approach: various theories have anticipated
the relation between ambiguous figures and creativity, the earliest
being expressed in the gestaltist movement (a nice summary of
the general gestaltist views on restructuring can be found in
Ohlsson (1983, 1984)). Recently, the first empirical investigations
to show results in confirming this direction of thought have
been obtained by Wiseman et al. (2011) and Doherty and
Mair (2012). In Wiseman et al. (2011), a correlation between
ease of ambiguous figures reversal and creativity as measured
using Guilford’s Alternative Uses Task has been observed
(Spearman’s rho = 0.28, p = 0.007). Doherty and Mair
(2012) have shown a correlation between ambiguous figures
and creativity as measured using the pattern meanings task
(Spearman’s rho = 0.42, p < 0.01).
2This level of re-representation could be discussed more widely in the context of
concepts and their features, rather than objects. We chose a discussion on objects
because in this case features are easier to determine, without running into the
question how concepts and their properties are represented. This approach has
the advantage that it can support the next level—that of insight problems—if the
problems tackled are in the practical object domain.
2.1. Setting up the Approach
In the following, each level of re-representation will be analyzed
in computational terms, using the context of the tasks of which an
overviewwas provided in section 2. The levels will thus be defined
in terms of input, pre-existing knowledge in the cognitive system,
output, and processes of re-representation.
These are described below:
1. the input – defines the initial sensory or conceptual input
of the task (in objective terms), be it features, objects, their
properties, object groups, scenes or problems, or descriptions
thereof;
2. the pre-existing knowledge – estimates what kind of
knowledge needs to be assumed to exist in the system, in
order for the processes of re-representation and various types
of output to be possible;
3. the output – represents the types of images, objects, uses,
object groups and plans of action (or representations thereof)
that are the results of the problem representation and re-
representation process;
4. re-representation – the process which we are trying to
observe at these various levels, takes into account existing
knowledge and input, as to produce various forms of output.
The following sections (3–5) explore how each of the previously





Level one refers to the ability to re-represent features as different
objects and images. The ambiguous figures tasks is tackled in
section 3.1. The pattern and line meaning tasks are explored
together in section 3.2. Section 3.3 provides a short summary of
the analytically observed traits of re-representation at this level.
3.1. Ambiguous Figures
The objective input in the duck-rabbit figure can be taken as
a set of visual features. The output is two images (or image
interpretations). The pre-existing knowledge is the knowledge of
the object represented in the image, or sometimes familiarity with
such a type of representation of this object3.
In order to interpret such features as being part of and
representing an object, a subset of these features has to be
selected, grouped andmatched to a known object or image. Some
such sets of features can be pre-grouped in feature groups which
can be mapped to various object parts, as shown in Figure 5
(bottom). In this case, the various feature groups are matched to
parts of the body of the animal which is seen as output. However,
various feature groups can be interpreted as different body parts,
as shown in Figure 5 (middle). Thus, whether one sees the duck
3This can be thought of as familiarity with a particular graphical style of
representation. For example, if one has never seen a rabbit represented as a
2D figure, in an iconic form and from the perspective from which it is usually
represented, the initial interpretation of such a figure as a rabbit might be hindered.
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FIGURE 5 | The duck-rabbit ambiguous figure. (Bottom) Split in feature
groups. (Top) With feature groups (fgx , x ∈ {1, 2, ..., 6}) parsed as object
(animal) parts.
or the rabbit can depend on which parts these feature groups are
interpreted to be.
In the case shown in Figure 5, interpreting feature group fg1
as a beak or ears, fg5 as a feathers or fur texture and fg6 as the back
of the head or the pout might make all the difference to seeing
one of the images, or the other. It is unclear in which order the
process happens: it might be that (i) cognitive systems directly
cast features in terms of one interpretation or the other (a top
down view), or that (ii) the various sets of features trigger the
body parts, which then trigger the interpretation of the image
(a bottom up view) or that (iii) one of the features, on which
the system is focusing, triggers the bigger picture, which in turn
triggers the interpretation of the body parts (a mixed view)4.
However, it is clear that (images of) ducks and rabbits
must have been encountered previously. The ability to switch
between these representations is the ability to (a) switch between
a potential mapping of the (objective) features to different
feature groups and/or objects or (b) switch between different
interpretations of these feature groups as objects. In the case of
the duck-rabbit illusion, a switch might very well be influenced
by (b) - the ability to re-categorize one of the initial sets of feature
groups as a different animal body part. However, in the case
of different ambiguous figures, where feature groups cannot be
allocated very neatly to one or another interpretation, features
groups themselves might need a different re-grouping to be able
to map to (or under the mapping of) different body parts. Thus
(c) the ability to switch between different objects as possible
4Other orders of process might also be possible. What we will focus on here is
not the order, but on the coarser granularity of process at which various sets
of features are represented and re-represented, or perceived and re-cast/seen as
different objects.
FIGURE 6 | Different illusions. (A) The girl saxophonist. (B) A three
interpretations ambiguous figure.
interpretations of features and thus arrange them in feature
groups might come into play. All three switches are different
facets of the re-representation process.
Before moving on to the pattern and line meanings task,
it is worth noting that not all ambiguous features are about
a re-representation of visual features as different groups or
an interpretation of such groups as different categories. For
example, in the girl-saxophonist illusion (Figure 6A), the
relations between feature groups are not one to one between
the two images. The switch between the two representations in
such cases seems to be done apart of the level of interpreting
the feature groups as different parts, at the level of choosing
what features to group to start with. Thus, grouping the features
required to categorize the saxophone already precludes grouping
the girl’s nose, chin and their shadows, while grouping the girl’s
mouth precludes part of the saxophonist’s coat. This also appears
in insight problems, where seeing one object with a particular
affordancemight impede solutions which include the same object
having different affordances.
Furthermore, sometimes such relations are not between visual
features groups, but rather between interpretations of spatial
relations. For example, Figure 6B shows an image with three
possible interpretations. The switch between two of these—
whether the three cubes are perceived as forming a pile on the
floor or hanging from the ceiling—depends on whether certain
surfaces are interpreted to be above or under other surfaces, and
whether they are emphasized as part of a certain cube or another.
If the shapes are perceived without projecting depth relations
over them, a different (2-D) image is perceived.
3.2. Pattern and Line Meanings
In the pattern and line meanings tasks, the input is still a set
of features. The output consists of different objects, groups of
objects and potentially scenes (e.g., a people waiting in line
representation of Figure 2A) as an interpretation. The pre-
existing knowledge is knowledge about said objects, groups of
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objects, contexts, relations and scenes, which is then brought to
bear on the interpretation.
A re-representational overlap can again be noticed: different
objects can all be projected on the initial set of features.
The pattern and line meanings task present a variant of the
representation and re-representation of features level, in the
sense that multiple interpretations can be made, and the set of
features can be matched to a much wider set of visual depictions.
Indeed, if ambiguous figures generally accommodate a maximum
of three possible interpretations, pattern and line meanings
can be interpreted as a set which is only restricted by featural
similarities to the initially presented stimulus. Thus pattern and
line stimuli from such tasks are much more ambiguous than
ambiguous figures (despite the name of the task), if the measure
of ambiguity is how many mappings can be made from the
stimulus to known objects or scenes representations.
The figure stimuli are also much more abstract than the ones
presented in the ambiguous figures task, and many more features
need to be added to construct a full representation. Ambiguous
figures can be considered as “abstract” stimuli as well of course,
in the sense that they are not complete 2D depictions of the object
(like a full image), but rather drawings or sketches. However,
the sets of features in the ambiguous figures contain much more
information about the figure being represented, thus constituting
a much more complete representation.
Ambiguous figures rely on the identification of an already
known pattern, which pre-exists in the memory of the system
(or has been experienced in a similar form), with the main task
being one of discriminating which features to take into account
and in which role. The pattern and line meanings task rely much
heavier on memory, as multiple known similar patterns can be
elicited, and, in a sense, the more such patterns a system has
acquired, the higher its potential performance in such a test, if re-
representational abilities are in place (thus if the participant can
switch with ease from one representation of the initial feature set
to another). The same can be said about the line meanings test
(Wallach and Kogan, 1965), with the only difference that, while
the line meaning test has to be interpreted without interrupting
the line, the mapping in the pattern meanings test might be from
multiple parts of the feature set to multiple objects. These objects
might have a common context: for example interpreting the four
circles in Figure 2A as flower heads contextually constrains the
interpretation of the incomplete rectangle as a flower pot, while
interpreting the same circles as bar stools or chairs contextually
constrains the interpretation of the incomplete rectangle as a bar
or a table.
Though the objects and scenes to which the pattern matching
is being done have to already exist in the knowledge base
of the cognitive system solving the task, a look at some of
the answers given by people when attempting this task shows
exactly how diverse and multi-faceted the human ability for
re-representation is.
The interpretations provided for Figure 2A show, amongst
other things, an ability to look at and imagine scenes from various
perspectives: for example, the barstools in front of a table are
viewed from above; the flower heads coming from a rectangular
flower pot are viewed from in front and possibly from the same
height, the Newton’s cradle toy is viewed upside down (and only
has four balls), etc.
Another interesting example of re-representation in the
pattern meanings task is depicted in Table 1. Here, the pattern
given as the stimulus, together with a subset of 11 answers
given by a human participant have been depicted visually. As the
responses have been given verbally, this visual depiction might
not be exactly what the participant had inmind, but we attempted
it in order to showcase the visual similarity of answers to the
pattern stimulus. As can be seen in Table 1, the answers are quite
varied and the similarity is very flexible. The representational
poses of the objects to which the similarity comparison is done
are also quite varied and flexible.
Procedures of interpretation of the various parts of the stimuli
as a group are at play from the very beginning. We also see
Gestaltic procedures of completion—thus the five circles of the
initial stimulus are interpreted as representing a circle in a variety
of answers, like in (a),(c),(e), etc. We observe procedures such as
tilting of the various objects—like the circle in (h), the wheel and
axle answer, or the stem in (k), the butterfly-shaped kite answer.
We observe contour shape modifications: for example, the circle
in the initial stimulus has to be compressed to an oval to match
(j), the space needle elevator. Other types of pattern completion
do exist: for example, it is the contour of the 5 circles that seems
to determine answers (b) and (k). Only three such circles are
selected for the group required in answer (d) arrow, and the
pattern completion is done to the shape of a triangle—the three
circles form its vertices. The number might play a role in answers
(f) hand and arm and (g) five fingertips. Answer (i) theme park
ride contains both a mapping of the initial circles and of the
imaginary completion one, whilst possibly (f), but more clearly
(g) map the initial circles too.
These examples speak about a process of parsing and re-
parsing initial features, while using them to search through a
variety of known objects, in multiple inclinations and poses.
Besides being answers, these can also be interpreted as visual
(imaginary) comparisons of known objects to existing features of
the stimulus, while searching for possible matches.
Also, various types of similarity of matches can exist,
depending on which visual properties are involved—for example,
a set of shape contour features initially taken from a mushroom
can be mapped to an icecream shape, however a different set
(e.g., the striations under a mushroom’s cap) could trigger the
possibility of re-representing the mushroom as an umbrella.
Thus parts of the visual pattern might trigger certain possible
interpretations, while other features might trigger others5.
3.3. Summary—Level 1
The first level refers to the interpretation of grouped or
ungrouped sets of features as possible known images, objects or
scenes. The input in this case is features. The output is images,
like in the ambiguous figures task, and objects or scenes, like in
the pattern meanings and line meanings task. These objects need
5There is of course no bound which would restrict re-representation at the visual
domain. Sticking to the visual however permits us to show figures of what wemean.
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TABLE 1 | Series of answers by a participant to a pattern meaning stimulus, their visual depiction and types of similarity with stimulus emphasized.
to have been previously known, though the particular amount of
knowledge required by each task can be different.
The process of re-representation is, in this case, the process of
mapping a set of input features to different types of known objects
and scenes, and switching between such various mappings. This
output is interpreted as being represented, in an incomplete form,
in the input: as sketches (ambiguous figures), or as allusions to an
object or a set of objects/visual scene (in the line meanings and
pattern meanings tasks).
4. LEVEL 2—OBJECTS AND PROPERTIES
RE-REPRESENTED AS DIFFERENT
OBJECTS
Level two refers to the ability of using existing objects as if they
were other objects (A newspaper can be used as an umbrella
or A cup can be used as a bell) and coming up with creative
uses for existing objects (like A wooly shoe can be used to wipe
kitchen surfaces with). Some such forms of creative inference are
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imperfect: some properties and/or some object parts might be
missing from the initial object, in order for it to be properly
transformed into or re-represented as a different object. An
example of properties missing: a magazine, made of glossy paper,
and preferably of a large size, might work much better as an
umbrella than a newspaper; some of the newspaper’s properties
(being made of paper) come slightly short of getting the job done
as an umbrella. As for missing parts, a cup is not yet a bell, it still
requires other parts, perhaps a spoon to hit it with or some other
form of clapper6.
The input to level two is objects and their properties. The
output is (a) other objects and/or (b) new affordances for existing
objects in the specific case of the Alternative Uses test.
The output is other objects (case a), when the re-
representation is done overtly, referring to objects: I can use a
shoe if I don’t have a hammer, to hammer in the nail. The shoe
and the hammer are already known, while the creative inference
might be known or made on the spot. If re-representation is
indeed at play at this level, the assertionA cup can be used as a bell
can be taken as I can re-represent the shape and material features
of a cup as the body of a bell. In a more general case, assertions
of the form I can use object A to replace object B, in the context of
task X can be taken as I can re-represent (a subset of) the features
and properties of object B, or the features and properties required
for task X, as object A.
The output can be an affordance (case b), like in the case of
the Alternative Uses test, when the answer given by a participant
is that a brick can be used to hit a nail, driving it through the wall.
A covert reference to known objects which one has performed
this task with (like a hammer, or a stone) might be made in
the process. The initial object, the covert referent object and its
affordances must all be known for the creative inference to be
made. Answers that A brick can be used to hit a nail can be taken
as I can re-represent (a subset of) the features and properties of a
hammer, which has the affordance of putting a nail in the wall, as
a brick. More generally, answers of the type I can use object A
for affordance X, can be taken as I can re-represent (a subset of)
the features and properties of object B, or features and properties
connected to affordance X, as object A.
A small set of answers to the Alternative Uses test question
‘What can you use a cup for?’ is shown in Table 2. The
third column shows overt and possible covert re-representation
objects. As mentioned above, this might be done with or without
covert object references; if done without, such inferences can be
based on existing sets of properties (from previous objects) which
co-occur with the performance of a particular task.
An example of an implementation of these principles is
the OROC system (Oltet¸eanu and Falomir, 2016), which uses
knowledge of object material, shape and other properties to make
both object replacements and inferences in the style of the AUT,
showing that the same core process can be applied to both types
of tasks. Figure 7A shows the case in which OROC needs to find
an object replacement for a Cup. OROC has previously encoded
a Cup with a set of material, shape, size, affordance and other
properties. It then uses its type of knowledge organization to
6The tongue or striker of a bell.
TABLE 2 | Alternative Uses test example, showing answers elicited and possible
re-representations of the object Cup.
Object Answers Object re-representation
Cup Draw a circle Circle form
Boil things in Pot
Keep door open Doorstop
Hinder something falling Bowl
Home decoration, if on a nail Decoration
Smash it for sharp edges Shards
As a hat Hat
Cap for a bottle Bottle cap
As a mace to smash garlic with Mace
To make sand castles Sand bucket
To dig earth Shovel
search for other objects which it has encoded in properties of
the required object—thus finding and proposing for the task
objects like a Bowl,Vase and a Bucket, which have similarmaterial
and shape.
Similarly, with a small extension of this process, OROC
proposes affordances to a particular object, thus being able to
answer AUT questions. Figure 7B shows this process. Objects
with which the initial object shares (similar) properties like shape
and material have affordances which are transferred to the initial
object. This can be interpreted as a process of re-representation
of an object (or a subset of its properties) through knowledge
and properties pertaining to another object. A Cup is thus re-
represented as a Pot, Bowl or Vase, and then the affordances of
such objects are attached to Cup as creative inferences of possible
uses. OROC uses similar objects for creative object composition.
Thus, in the case of this level, what is being re-represented
is an object, or sets of object parts, features and properties, as
different objects. It might be that such properties are already
memorized and/or organized in the memory of the solver or
creative agent, or that the features of the given object are re-
represented in order to produce new uses ad hoc.
5. LEVEL 3—OBJECTS AND PROBLEM
RE-REPRESENTATION
In order to showcase re-representation at the level of insight
problems, the case of such an insight problem, a problem
involving practical objects, will be analyzed. Practical object use
insight problems make for a worthy case study for the obvious
reason that re-representation(s) in such a problem is much easier
to talk about in concrete terms (about objects, actions, plans
and affordances) than in abstract insight problems (which might
involve abstract re-representations).
In the case of practical object insight problems, the input
is a visual scene—that is a set of object or object groups, in
various relations to each other7. The output is an action plan of
7Note: It is useful to emphasize that objects are in themselves groups: groups of
object parts, and can also be seen as groups of properties, or even features.
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FIGURE 7 | Using re-representation of properties for (A) object replacement and (B) alternative use answers in OROC. The process follows the direction of the arrows.
how to solve a particular problem—that is a set of actions using
objects, and putting objects in various relations in the process8.
This requires existing knowledge on objects, object properties,
parts and relations, actions with objects and consequences of
such actions. We call knowledge about sets of objects, actions
involving them and their relations, and the consequence of
these actions problem templates (Oltet¸eanu, 2014). Such problem
templates might have been learned while interacting with objects,
or through communication. The consequences of particular
known problem templates may or may not be helpful in coming
up with the solution to a particular current problem.
In the process of solving an insight problem, re-representation
involves seeing the problem in a different way, that is recasting
the problem in different problem templates, object templates
or other pre-existing representations. These terms will become
clearer as we take a look at the two strings problem. This problem
is presented as shown in Figure 8. The participant is told: A
person is put in a room that has two strings hanging from the
ceiling. They have to tie the two strings together. How can they do
this, knowing that it is impossible to reach one string while holding
the other?
While attempting to solve this problem, human participants
come up with different possible fragments of the solution (as
shown by a think aloud experiment) or with constructions
which point to a process of re-representation of the problem
objects through various problem and action templates, or object
templates. For example, some people try to build solutions
which involve:
• climbing on the chair. This requires grouping existing object
elements into a small problem or action template like the one
shown in Figure 9A, which has as a consequence the person
in the problem being in a higher position; some participants
think that being higher will allow them to reach further by
grabbing one of the strings at a different point;
• hammering the ropes to the ceiling (this is afforded by first
climbing on the chair). This involves the re-representation of
elements of the problems like the nail and the pliers via existing
8Because objects in various relations may have different affordances.
FIGURE 8 | The two strings problem.
knowledge or representation pieces, like the one shown in
Figure 9B; in the process the pliers are also re-represented
as a hammer;
• rolling paper, as shown in Figure 9C—this is useful when the
paper itself is re-represented as a string extension or a string
connector, like in Figure 9E;
• rolling the T-shirt of the person in the room into a piece
of rope, as shown in Figure 9D. This again allows re-
representation and use of the T-shirt object as a form of a
rope object;
• connecting strings or items that can be re-represented as a
string (paper, T-shirt), like in Figure 9E, sometimes with the
purpose of prolonging them or the initial two strings;
• using the pliers to grab one of the strings hanging from the
ceiling, thus possibly using a pliers and wire representation like
the one in Figure 9F to re-represent existing pliers and wire-
like objects (e.g., the strings); in the context of this problem,
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FIGURE 9 | Visual depiction of different representations used to organize or re-represent problem objects when solving two strings problem—from (A) hammering a
nail in the wall to (G) pendulum.
using the pliers to grab the string also has the consequence of
elongating one’s arm reach;
• or, the actual acknowledged solution to this problem—
building a pendulum like the one in Figure 9G. This is done by
using a string and a heavy object in the room (like the pliers),
attaching the heavy object to one of the strings, and using its
new affordance as a pendulum to swing it around, having it
move toward you while you are holding on to the first string.
This requires recasting or re-representing the string and pliers
or the string and jar objects and/or their properties through
the template of a pendulum. Thus, an object template is used
to re-represent part of the problem objects, leading to a new
type of affordance, and a possible solution.
Some such problem solving fragments might involve simple
grouping of existing elements (like Figure 9A) in an existing
representation, and are straightforward. Others might involve
more complex forms of re-representation, in which various
objects are replaced with others—like nailing the rope to
the ceiling with a non-existent hammer (Figure 9B)—which
has to be re-represented from another object (pliers) or its
set of features.
Furthermore, the use of various templates allows for others to
be deployed, as shown in the previous examples: climbing on the
chair is a necessary part of hammering the ropes to the ceiling;
rolling the paper or the cloth is necessary in deploying another
template which involves lengthening and connecting the ropes,
or whatever objects are now re-represented as the ropes, etc. Some
object groupings and higher level representations of sets of objects
as one functional unit might thus trigger other objects in the scene
to be grouped in a certain way, in the same manner in which
interpreting a set of visual features as part of a certain group might
trigger or be related to already existing possible interpretations of
the entire image9.
The use of certain representations precludes or at least
impedes others being used. For example, if the pliers have been
re-represented as a hammer and part of a fixing the string to
the ceiling with a nail problem template, human solvers might
encounter difficulties in re-representing (the same pliers) as a
9Like in the passage talking about this process with images, it is not the purpose of
this paper to make an assumption about whether this process is top down, bottom
up or an interaction between the two, but to showcase re-representation in general
and the need for cognitive frameworks which integrate its multiple levels.
weight, part of a pendulum template. This is similar to what
we remarked in the case of some ambiguous figures—when
one set of features has been represented as a nose, they or an
overlapping subset cannot be represented as a saxophone at the
same time. Re-representation thus is required here too, just at a
different level.
To explore whether relations between these tasks can be found
empirically, and thus re-representation can be studied at multiple
levels, a study involving these tasks was deployed and is reported
in the following section.
6. STUDY
6.1. Participants
A sample of 175 participants was recruited using Crowdflower,
37 of which had to be excluded due to giving incomplete or
nonsensical answers. This resulted in a total sample size of 138
participants (63% females, 37% males) whose answers were used
for further analysis. Ages were recorded using an ordinal scale
with age brackets of 10 years. The age ranges of the participants
were: under 20 years (n = 8), 20–30 years (n = 30), 30–40 years
(n = 49), 40–50 years (n = 23), 50–60 years (n = 24), 60–70
years (n = 3), and over 70 years (n = 1). Most participants had
higher education with 58 (42%) having completed undergraduate
courses and 16 (11.6%) having completed postgraduate courses.
Nine (6.5%) were enrolled in postgraduate courses, 12 (8.7%)
in undergraduate courses, 31 (22.5%) had finished their high
school diploma, and 12 (8.7%) finished secondary school. Using
a 5-point Likert-scale, self-ratings of both creativity (mean =
2.81, SD = 1.04) and problem-solving (mean = 2.88, SD = 0.96)
were gathered.
An approval by the ethics committee was not necessary as
per our institution and national guidelines, because no risks
were attached to the study. Informed online consent was given
by the participants to use the anonymized data for research
purposes. Participants received a payment in Crowdflower for
their participation.
6.2. Method
6.2.1. Ambiguous Figures Task
For this task, five different pictures showing ambiguous figures
were used. Participants were first shown the picture and asked
what they saw. Following that, they were informed about the two
different figures that can be seen in the picture. They were asked
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if they could see both figures. Participants were then shown each
picture for 1 min, while they were instructed to mentally switch
between figures and press a button whenever they could see the
other figure. Both the number of key presses and the time passed
between presses were recorded.
6.2.2. Pattern Meanings Test
In the pattern meanings test, participants were shown six
different patterns composed of simple abstract geometric objects,
one at a time. They were instructed to write down “asmany things
as they could come up with for what the object can be.” The
time the participant took for each pattern and his or her answers
were recorded.
6.2.3. Alternative Uses Task
Participants were given an everyday object, to which they
should give as many alternative uses as possible. This procedure
was repeated for 5 different objects. Those objects were
carpet, newspaper, cup, dental floss, and toothbrush. Again, the
answers and how much time participants took for each object
were recorded.
6.2.4. Insight Tasks
Two insight problems were given to the participants: the candle
problem and the Jack and Jill weight problem . They were
instructed that these problems could have several possible
answers and that they should think of possible solutions andwrite
them down. The problems were formulated as follows:
“You are given a candle, a box of thumbtacks and a book of
matches. You are supposed to fix the lit candle unto the wall in a
way that does not allow the wax to drip below. What do you do?”
(candle problem).
“Jack and Jill are arguing about who weighs more. What could they
do to find out for certain?” (Jack and Jill weight problem).
Each of the problems was accompanied by a picture, both of
which can be found in the Appendix, together with the image
stimuli of the other tasks. The tasks were always given in the same
order. However, the stimuli in each category were presented in a
randomized manner.
6.3. Results
6.3.1. Ambiguous Figures Task
The results for the ambiguous figures task can be seen in Table 3,
which shows the mean number of switches per minute for
each figure, as well as an average over all trials. Additionally,
standard deviations are shown. Mean time until switch tells
how much time passed on average until a switch between the
two representations was reported. For example, for picture 1,
participants produced on average 19.64 key presses (SD =
21.12), and were able to switch between representations about
every 3 seconds.
Additionally, the number of key presses over time for all
participants was plotted using frequency polygons. This was done
for pictures 1–5 individually and for all pictures combined. These
graphs can be seen in Table 4.
6.3.2. Pattern Meanings Test
Results for the pattern meanings test are shown in Table 5.
Fluency is the number of answers given; Flexibility measures
how many semantic domains these answers cover, based on
human ratings. Additionally, response times per pattern (the
time a participant took for giving all the answers), and
response times per meaning are shown. The response times
per meaning were not recorded directly—they are averaged
from the number of responses produced and the total response
time per pattern.
6.3.3. Alternative Uses Task
Results can be found in Table 6. Fluency and Flexibility constitute
the same measures as in the pattern meanings test, only for the
number of alternative uses named for each given object. Response
times per object and response time per use can also be found
in the table.
6.3.4. Insight Tasks
Answers were rated for their correctness. Answers that included
parts of the right solution received a score of 0.5. For the candle
problem 51 participants (37%) had the right answer, 48 (35%)
answered partly right, and 39 (28%) did not give the right answer
to the problem. Four participants (3%) came up with the correct
solution to the Jack and Jill weight problem, and one (1%)
answered partly right.
6.3.5. Reliability Analysis
For reliability analysis, Cronbach’s alpha was calculated for
Fluency in the patternmeanings test (α = 0.91), in the alternative
uses task (α = 0.93) and for the number of key presses in
the ambiguous figures task (α = 0.89). As all values reached
satisfying levels, mean values were calculated for each task and
used as an indicator for performance.
6.3.6. Comparison of Measures
The so computed indicators of Fluency in both the pattern
meaning test and the alternative uses task, as well as for
performance in the ambiguous figures task were correlated
with each other. A strong (according to Cohen, 1992) positive
correlation was found between performance on the pattern
meanings test and the alternative uses task (r = 0.77, p <
0.001). Correlations of Fluency values in the pattern meanings
test (r = 0.32, p < 0.001) and in the alternative uses task
(r = 0.37, p < 0.001) with the ambiguous figures task had a
medium effect size.
A possible connection between performance on the insight
problems and the other tasks was explored using the Kruskal-
Wallis test by ranks. As only so few participants had the
right answer to the Jack and Jill weight problem, only the
answers to the candle problem were considered. Figures 10–
12 show boxplots using performance on the candle problem
as a grouping variable. These groups are compared by their
performance on the ambiguous figures task, the pattern
meanings test and the alternative uses task using the number
of key presses and Fluency as indicators for performance.
The Kruskal-Wallis test revealed differences in Fluency for
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TABLE 3 | Results of the ambiguous figures task.
Picture 1 Picture 2 Picture 3 Picture 4 Picture 5 Overall
Mean key presses 19.64 27.58 25.08 31.56 34.32 27.63
SD 21.12 22.31 23.45 23.91 28.72 24.51
Mean time until switch in seconds 3.05 2.18 2.39 1.90 1.73 2.17
TABLE 4 | Frequency of key presses over time for each of the pictures used in the ambiguous figures task, as well as for all of the pictures combined, displayed in a
frequency polygon.
The x-axis shows the time in seconds and the y-axis the number of key presses.
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TABLE 5 | Results of the pattern meanings test: mean values and standard deviations (in parentheses) of fluency, flexibility, total response time and response time per
meaning.
Pattern 1 Pattern 2 Pattern 3 Pattern 4 Pattern 5 Pattern 6 Overall
Fluency 3.38 2.75 3.09 3.10 2.54 2.65 2.92
(1.83) (1.61) (1.80) (2.00) (1.75) (1.38) (1.76)
Flexibility 2.90 2.34 2.59 2.70 2.20 2.19 2.48

































TABLE 6 | Results of the alternative uses task: mean values and standard deviations (in parentheses) of fluency, flexibility, total response time and response time per use.
Carpet Newspaper Cup Dental floss Toothbrush Overall
Fluency 3.20 4.73 4.09 3.32 3.46 3.76
(2.10) (2.69) (2.56) (2.05) (2.13) (2.39)
Flexibility 2.43 3.72 2.95 2.67 2.18 2.79





























FIGURE 10 | Boxplot comparing the participants’ (i) answers to the candle
problem (not correct, partly correct or correct), with (ii) their performance on
the ambiguous figures task (measured as number of key presses).
the pattern meanings test (Cohen’s d = 0.476, p < 0.05)
and the alternative uses task (Cohen’s d = 0.675, p <
0.001), but not for performance on the ambiguous figures
task (p = 0.117, 1− β = 0.362). Pairwise comparisons revealed
that for the pattern meanings test there was a significant
difference for the comparison correct—not correct (p <
0.01). Additionally, there were significant differences for the
alternative uses task; here, Fluency differed significantly between
the groups correct—partly correct (p < 0.05), and correct—not
correct (p < 0.001).
FIGURE 11 | Boxplot comparing the participants that gave an answer to the
candle problem that was not correct, partly correct or correct by their
performance on the pattern meanings test, measured by fluency.
7. A UNIFIED MODEL FOR VARIOUS
LEVELS OF RE-REPRESENTATION
In this section, all three levels of re-representation are shown in
the context of a unified model.
Feature Space Level: At the feature space level, the input
stimulus I is formally represented as a set of features:
I = {fgi|i = 1 to n}
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FIGURE 12 | Boxplot comparing the participants that gave an answer to the
candle problem that was not correct, partly correct or correct by their
performance on the alternative uses task, measured by fluency.
where n = total number of individual features perceived fgi = ith
feature of the input stimulus. The re-representation here involves
matching a subset of features of the input to known visual
patterns; this type of re-representation involves grouping the
features under various known patterns, searching and comparing
them to patterns and objects in KB and then interpreting them as
one of these known patterns or objects.
A) Ambiguous Figures test
In the context of ambiguous figures, re-representation happens
as follows. Given the rabbit-duck problem in Figure 5, when the
set of features fg1 − fg6 are grouped together and fg1, fg5, fg6 are
matched to the visual stimulus of beak, feathers and back of head,
respectively, the figure is represented as a duck. By contrast,
when the features fg1, fg5, fg6 are matched to the visual stimulus
of ears, fur and pout, the figure is represented as a rabbit. Re-
representation in this case is the process of regrouping the
initial sets of features in different ways and matching them to a
different pattern.
B) Pattern and line meaning test
In the context of the patterns meanings test (Figure 13), when
the agent focuses on all features fg1 − fg6, and fg1 − fg5 are
grouped together in the Gestalt of a circle, the pattern can be
represented/interpreted as a lollipop (Figure 13a). When the
agent selects and groups features fg1, fg3 and fg5 as the vertices of a
triangle (Figure 13b), the set of features can be re-represented as
an arrow. Similarly, when the roundness of fg3, fg4 is emphasized
and they are matched to a known visual pattern of fingertips,
the set of features fg3, fg4, and fg6 can be re-represented as five
fingertips and palm (Figure 13c). The various re-representations
takes place as follows:
I → {fg1, fg2, fg3, fg4, fg5, fg6} → [circular shape, stick]→ object(‘lollipop’)
I → {fg1, fg3, fg5, fg6} → [three vertices, supporting line]→ object(‘arrow’)
I → {fg3, fg4, fg6} → [two fingertips, palm]→ object(’hand’)
It is important to mention that even when the same set of features
are focused upon, there can be multiple re-representation
outcomes. For example, in the same set of features are
being focused upon in both (a) and (b); however in (a)
the set of features are re-represented as a lollipop while in
(b) as a tree. Re-representation in this case is the ability to
regroup the features and re-map them to a different known
pattern or object.
Concept Level: The object level of re-representation
can happen at follows. In the CreaCogs framework
(Oltet¸eanu and Falomir, 2016):
fs_shape refers to the feature space of shapes in the
knowledge base (KB),
fs_material refers to the feature space of material in the KB,
fs_color refers to the feature space of colors in the KB ,
fs_size refers to the feature space of height, depth and width
of the objects in the KB,
fs_affordance refers to the feature space of
actions/motions that can be done using the object,
fs_name refers to the feature space of object names in the KB .
An object/concept X in the CreaCogs framework is described as
an activation of its features as follows:
∀X∃s ∈ fs_shape, ∃m ∈ fs_material, ∃c ∈
fs_color, ∃z ∈ fs_size, ∃a ∈ fs_affordance, ∃n ∈ fs_names
object(X) ⊆ [shape(X, s) ∧ material(X,m) ∧
color(X, c) ∧ size(X, z) ∧ affordance(X, a) ∧ name(X, n)]
According to this scheme of formalization, the object cup and
vase can be described as:
object(cup) → [shape(cup, high_convexity) ∧material(cup, glass) ∧
affordance(cup, to_drink_from) ∧ name(cup, hcc_cup)
object(vase) → [shape(vase, high_convexity) ∧material(vase, ceramic) ∧
affordance(vase, keep_flowers_in) ∧ name(vase, hcc_vase)
The re-representation at this level is done by comparing the
original object to the other object in terms of object properties
such as material, shape, size etc. This is shown in Figure 14
and has been implemented computationally in a system that can
come up with different uses for objects, by recasting them as
objects which have similar properties (Oltet¸eanu and Falomir,
2016). In a more general form, assertions of the form I can
use object B to replace object A, in the context of task X can
be taken as I can re-represent (a subset of) the features and
properties of object A (which have been connected to task X)
as object B.
The OROC system (Oltet¸eanu and Falomir, 2016)
establishes that the shape and material of a pot
(“medium_convexity_with_handle”, “metal”) are similar to
that of a cup (“high_convexity,” “glass”), and draws inferences
about the affordances of a pot also applying to a cup. This is a
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FIGURE 13 | Features re-represented as different objects in the Pattern Meanings task. (a) lollipop, (b) arrow, and (c) five fingertips.
form of re-representing a pot as a cup. Similarly, the features of
a cup can be re-represented as a vase, by noticing the similarity
between the shape and material of vase to that of cup. This object
cup (as shown in Figure 14) thus has its constraints relaxed and
inherits affordances from the object vase:
object(cup)→ [shape(cup, high_convexity) ∧material(cup, glass)
∧affordance(cup, keep_flowers_in) ∧ name(cup, hcc_cup)
Problem Template Level: A problem template is formally
represented as a set of concepts(Ci), relations(Ri),
actions(Hi), goals(Gi) and constraints(Cxi).
Where,
Concepts are everyday objects with properties such as
shape, material, size etc.
Relations are an association between two or
more concepts.
Actions are the action performed on the concepts which
may or may not lead to a change in relation.
Goals are a set of concepts and relations.
Constraints describe the resource or action limits
of the task.
For the two strings problem, the concepts,
relations, goal and constraints can be conceptualized
as follows:
• C1,C2 − String1, String2
• C3 − Person
• C4 − Chair
• C5 − Pliers
• C6 − Jar_of _nails
• C7 − Sheets_of _paper
• C8 − Nails
• R1,R2 − hanging(String1, ceiling), hanging(String2, ceiling)
• R3,R4,R5 − onFloor(Chair), onFloor(Sheets_of _paper),
onFloor(Jar_of _nails), onFloor(nails)
• R6 − holds(Person, String1)
• Gsol − {tie(String1, String2)}








The re-representation here is of objects, objects sets and problem
templates as different objects and problem templates. Figure 15
shows re-representation processes at this level in the context of
the two strings problem. The of the problem is to tie the two
strings together. The original problem template was the person
trying to grab the second string while holding on to the first
string. But the constraint specifically forbids this action, therefore
other problem templates need to be triggered and applied to
find a solution.
In Figure 15a the initial problem is re-represented through
a template where the person is trying to hold the second string
from a different height, assuming this will help reach further.
The objects in the room (chair, agent) are thus re-represented
as elements of this problem. In Figure 15b the template of
trying to grab the other string using the pliers is triggered.
This can be triggered either bottom up—from the object to
the template level (by noticing the pliers exist in their room
and thinking of their functionality), or top down, by thinking
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FIGURE 14 | Objects and properties re-represented as different objects. (a) cup, (b) pot, and (c) vase.
of ways to extend one’s hand (the pliers would help reach a
bit further).
Figures 15d,e show even more interesting cases of re-
representation, as in them re-representation takes place at both
problem template and concept level. In Figure 15d, the T-shirt of
the man is re-represented as a rope. Then, the original problem
is re-represented using a template of elongating the string by
knotting two strings, where the template has been relaxed to
tie the T-shirt to the rope. In Figure 15e, the pliers are re-
represented as a weight, and then together with the string re-
represented as a pendulum. This is probably triggered by and
enables the use of a problem template containing knowledge
about swinging the pendulum to get the rope to move toward
you. In all the cases, the original problem is being re-represented
with the help of different problem templates, and sometimes
objects are re-represented as well.
The re-representation at this level is formalized as
I → {C1,C2,C3} → PT(original): {C = {C1,C2,C3},R =
{holds(C3,C1)},G = {tie(C1,C2)}}
I → {C2,C3} → PT(elongate_string): {C = {C2,Tshirt},H =
{attach(C2,Tshirt},G = {Cnew = {longer_string}}
I → {C2,C5} → PT(make_pendulum): {C = {C2,C5},R =
{attached{C2,C5},H = {swing(C2)},G = {Cnew = {pendulum}}
8. DISCUSSION
8.1. Discussion of the Results
The goal of this study was to investigate if there is an ability of
re-representation that underlies performance on the ambiguous
figures task, the pattern meaning test, the alternative uses test and
insight problems. Indeed, many of the obtained results lead in
that direction. The results of Wiseman et al. (2011) and Doherty
and Mair (2012) could be confirmed by showing correlations
between the ambiguous figures task and the alternative uses task,
as well as between the ambiguous figures task and the pattern
meanings test, with a much ampler participant size. Additionally,
a correlation between the alternative uses task and the pattern
meanings test was shown, with a much higher effect size.
A possible connection to performance on the insight tasks
was explored using performance on the candle problem as a
grouping variable. This was due to several reasons. First, due
to the fact that in this study only two insight problems were
given, it was not possible to explore the data at an interval
level. Also, the Jack and Jill weight problem turned out to be
quite difficult for participants, so that only very few were able to
solve it. This limited the analysis to a group-wise comparison,
dividing participants by their ability to provide a correct or at
least partly correct solution for the candle problem. This was
not possible for the Jack and Jill weight problem, as the groups
would have been too different in their size. Due to violation of
the assumption of normality, it was also not possible to conduct
an ANOVA, thus analysis was limited to non-parametric tests.
These revealed that on average, people with higher fluency ratings
would have a higher chance at answering the candle problem
correctly, indicating that these tasks share common features. This
notion does not seem to hold true for the ambiguous figures task,
though this comparison lacks power and ought to be investigated
in future studies.
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FIGURE 15 | Objects and problem re-representation in the two strings problem. (a) climbing on chair template, (b) extending arm by using pliers, (c) tying two ropes,
(d) tying rope and t-shirt, and (e) pendulum.
Generally our results support the hypothesis of an underlying
ability of re-representation. The correlations between the
ambiguous figures task, the pattern meanings task and the
alternative uses test provide strong evidence for that notion,
and insight task results, though exploratory in their nature,
show some clear tendencies. What is however notable in the
correlational results obtained is that they do not directly reflect
the proposed level structure, as seen in Figure 4.
The correlation of the pattern meanings task with the
alternative uses task shows a higher effect size than the other
two correlations. From our theory, we would expect to see the
ambiguous figures task and the pattern meanings task more
closely related, as both involve the re-representation of features,
in contrast to the alternative uses test, where participants need
to re-represent objects. One thing that could explain this is the
aspect of motivation. As there was no time limit given for the
pattern meanings task and the alternative uses test, motivation
might have played an important role in how long participants
were trying to come up with new solutions. This was not the case
for the ambiguous figures task, where participants had a time
limit of 1 min after which the task was over, so that motivation
might not have been as important.
The fact that in one task the possible representations were
given, while in the other two participants had to come up with
their own, might also have an influence on motivation and
participant performance. Verbal fluency may also have an impact
on the results, in that people who generally have a higher verbal
fluency may be better at coming up with more answers in the
pattern meanings task and alternative uses task. In future studies,
the influence of these possible confounds should be investigated
and, if necessary, controlled for.
8.2. General Discussion
Three levels of re-representation have thus been described, in
the context of four empirical tasks. These tasks can be used to
explore the relation between the different levels and compare
computational models and artificial cognitive systems output
to human output. A similar type of computational process
could thus be used to solve all these types of tasks, with
differences in terms of the type of knowledge and amount of
knowledge used.
At the computational system level, this requires an integrated
multi-level modeling approach: a unified framework in which all
three levels are modeled, and in which only the input, output,
and access to the amount of memorized knowledge brought
to the process changes, but the process stays the same or is
similarly implemented. This is showcased in Figure 16A. At
a coarse granularity, in the context of the levels previously
analyzed, re-representation seems to be a process of grouping
various input features into different possible known outputs, which
are already known (or in structures similar to those outputs) in
order to obtain different functionality of the representation, access
different affordances connected to other objects, access different
possible actions connected to other problem templates or action
plans, or transform the initial representation altogether, creating a
new object, problem template etc.
The output of the various levels which have been described
here defines the interpretation or types of representations
which are projected unto the input by the cognitive system,
or the secondary properties which might follow from this
representation (like new affordances, new solutions). Sometimes
the output of a new representation is clear, and at other times this
can only be observed because of its secondary properties.
As shown in Figure 16B, this approach posits that re-
representation, displayed by the green arrows, acts between and
at multiple levels of representational complexity. Integrative
cognitive frameworks or architectures should thus be able to
model, explain and display the process at all these levels. One
of the inherent difficulties of modeling at all these levels will of
course be one of representational complexity. Not to be neglected
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FIGURE 16 | Re-representation. (A) As the same process, with different types
of input and output; the output changes as a function of the process. (B)
Re-representation (green arrows) acting at and between different levels of
representational complexity.
are also possible cascade effects of re-representation between
multiple levels. For example, focusing on a different subset of
features might make a solver see an object as a different potential
object, which could qualify it for affordances and grouping in a
different set of objects that together would make the problem
be re-represented. Before accounting for such cascade effects,
perhaps each possible level of re-representation should be studied
in more depth on its own.
A computationally similar view on different processes will
help simplify the modeling and implementation of each of these
processes and tasks in computational cognitive systems. This will
allow the further study of these tasks. If indeed the process is the
same or similar at the three levels expressed here, then this unified
synthetic approach should help understand re-representation
in a much clearer manner by comparative exploration and
experimentation of the specific levels, assuming initial differences
in representation complexity (and in the manipulation of
representations of different type and/or complexity). Association,
similarity or other processes whichmight make re-representation
possible have been tackled elsewhere (Oltet¸eanu, 2014; Oltet¸eanu
and Falomir, 2015, 2016).
The current results of our study point in the direction of a
relationship between the proposed tasks. However, no empirical
argument in favor of a hierarchy of levels re-representations has
yet been obtained, and one of our reviewers rightly points out
that all these types of representations could co-exist in parallel.
In future work we may be able to use a computational model to
differentiate between these two hypotheses. We however believe
that the three levels are useful artifacts for thinking about and
modeling the types of information which is being processed:
features, concepts and objects, problem templates (sets of objects,
relations and actions).
In their paper, Öllinger et al. (2008) examine how mental
set affects process of representational change. Mental set is
defined as the tendency to solve certain problems in a fixed way
based on previous solutions to similar problems. In CreaCogs,
the corresponding element to mental set is fixation within a
problem template which is triggered to solve a problem. Problem
templates are structured sets of actions and ways of solving
problems saved in the knowledge base (or memory of the solver).
They are based on previous knowledge of objects, their relations,
object properties, actions and how these have satisfied previous
goals. Mental set is considered to be an artifact of the selection
process (Anderson, 1982; Newell, 1994; Lovett and Anderson,
1996) In CreaCogs, the selection problem still stands, though it
is not one we focus on this paper. That is, mental set can happen
because one of the problem templates is selected preferentially
over others, and the agent doing the problem solving is finding
it difficult to re-represent the problem via a template which
would provide more chances of success. One way to work on this
problem in CreaCogs in the future would be tomake assumptions
or gather data on how familiar various templates are to various
solvers, and then encode this computationally, through adding
weights to the various templates.
In Öllinger et al.’s paper, representational change involves
at least two possibilities—chunk decomposition and constraint
relaxation. Chunk decomposition is analogous to object
decomposition in CreaCogs, as an object which is perceived as
a whole can be broken down to its constituent parts (or further
sub components), and its components can be applied to solving
the problem, or regrouped in other object configurations (the
same stands for problem templates). The parallel to constraint
relaxation in CreaCogs is relaxing the natural and learned biases
against breaking objects, using problem templates in an already
familiar way, crossing common sense or common practice norms
or aesthetic values. This helps ease the re-representation process.
Öllinger et al. focus on the influence of various strategies,
like chunk decomposition and constraint relaxation (or just
standard type) on the participants further ability to solve
problems requiring the same or other types of representational
change. They however do not model nor describe the
representational change process in terms which could serve for
a computational implementation. The present paper does not
make a statement regarding how representational change of one
type influences other types of representational change. Instead,
it focuses on finding various tasks with which the process of
representational change could be explored and tested. This paper
also aims for these empirical tasks to involve different types
of stimuli, with different degrees of information complexity,
and represent different knowledge levels of a cognitive agent
and architecture. An initial re-representation mechanism which
can be computationally modeled was put forward for all these
information (and stimuli) levels.
The ambiguity of the various stimuli is also an interesting
issue. In some cases, the ambiguity may allow for easier and more
creative re-representations, and perhaps computational measures
of ambiguity could be proposed at all the three levels. Our initial
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guess is that such a measure of ambiguity would require taking
into account how many representations a certain scene can be
parsed and represented as, which would probably be dependent
on the cognitive system doing the re-representation. This would
be hard to measure in natural cognitive systems, though perhaps
a set of strong dominating possibilities of re-representations
could be discerned for a particular set of stimuli, through
empirical investigation. However, a computational measure of
ambiguity would be interesting andmuchmore feasible to deploy
in artificial cognitive systems. The generativity of a particular
artificial system might be a function of this measure of ambiguity
and the system’s capacity for re-representation.
This paper has put forward a multi-layered approach to re-
representation. This approach aims to meaningfully integrate
the performance in four different tasks to the study of re-
representation as one cognitive process. If the differences based
on knowledge between these different levels prove to influence
the process itself in significant ways, re-representation can still
be integrated as one class of processes. Such integration will
support the unified empirical and computational study of a class
of creative problem solving processes.
9. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK
This paper has proposed that re-representation, a key process in
creative problem solving and human creativity, can and should be
analyzed in a more integrative manner. Toward this, three levels
of re-representation were explored. Tasks were used to exemplify
and analyse the characteristics the re-representation process takes
at each of these levels, in order to clarify the process itself.
An empirical study across these tasks confirmed our
hypothesis that relations can be established between these tasks,
replicated two previous studies with an ample number of
participants and uncovered a new strong and significant relation
between the PatternMeanings Test and the Alternative Uses Test.
Our proposal was that the re-representation process be
modeled all three levels: (i) re-representation of features as
different objects or images, (ii) re-representations of objects and
their properties as different objects, and (iii) re-representation
of objects, objects sets, scenes and problems as different object
and problem templates. An initial unified model for the re-
representation process has been put forward and showcased at
all these levels.
As future work we will aim to:
• Formalize each proposed level of re-representation;
• Attempt tomodel the various levels computationally under the
same cognitive framework;
• Explore the underlying factors of empirical performance in
these tasks.
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